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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE CITY OF SALT LAKE, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
JONATHAN LAMAR ARCHIBALD, : Case No. 20001079-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Archibald's motion to 
suppress based on the court's conclusion that Mr. Archibald was not seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment when police officers questioned him? 
Standard of Review: The factual findings underlying a trial court's 
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error. Salt 
Lake City v. Rav. 998 P.2d 274,276 (Utah App. 2000); State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 
1225,1226-27 (Utah App. 1997). A trial court's determination of whether a 
citizen-police encounter constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure is a legal 
conclusion, based on a totality of facts, which is reviewed for correctness. Ray. 
998P.2dat276. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, amendment IV. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Jonathan Lamar Archibald was charged with concealing his identity based on an incident 
in June of 2000 wherein Mr. Archibald was alleged to have given an incorrect name and date of 
birth to police officers. 
Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress and memorandum in support thereof, arguing 
that the police officers unlawfully detained Mr. Archibald. (R. 16-25.) The City failed to file a 
response prior to the suppression hearing. At the hearing, defense counsel and the City 
Prosecutor stipulated to the facts as set forth m defense counsel's memorandum and proffered 
additional stipulated facts. (R. 82-83.) After hearing argument from counsel, the court took the 
matter under advisement. (R. 94.) 
The court denied Mr. Archibald's motion, concluding that Mr. Archibald was not 
unlawfully detained when officers questioned him regarding his identity and date of birth. (R. 15; 
76.) Mr. Archibald then entered a conditional plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his 
suppression motion. (R. 76-79.) Mr. Archibald timely appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 27,2000, an Information was filed in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
Department, in and for Salt Lake City, State of Utah, charging Jonathan Lamar Archibald with 
one count of concealing identification, a class C misdemeanor, pursuant to Salt Lake City Code § 
11.04.100 (1996). (R. 1.) Mr. Archibald pled not guilty and counsel was appointed. 
On September 10, defense counsel filed the motion to suppress and memorandum in 
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support thereof. (R. 16-25.) A motion hearing was set for October 16, 2000. The City failed to 
file a response to defense counsel's motion and memorandum. 
At the suppression hearing on October, 16,2000, counsel stipulated to the facts as set 
forth in Mr. Archibald's memorandum, and additional facts proffered by the prosecution. (R. 82-
83.) On Monday, June 26,2000, at 10:47 p.m., Salt Lake City Police Officer Brent Hillam 
"responded to suspicious circumstances at 176 W 600 S #201 (Motel 6) at 2247 hours." (R. 16.) 
The impetus for the officer's visit was that "[a]n anonymous comp. stated that there were 
possible criminal activities inside the given room." (R. 16.) A supplemental police report 
indicates that the "Anon comp reporting drugs and solicitation in rm 201 unkn number of susps 
#1 Asian female nfd." (R. 16.) 
Upon arriving at the motel, the officers1 knocked on the front door of motel room #201, 
the only entrance into and exit from the motel room. (R. 17; 89.) Although no one responded to 
the officers' knocks, the officers observed a face looking through the curtained window of the 
motel room. (R. 17.) Upon seeing the officers, the occupant quickly removed his face from the 
window and declined to respond to the officers' knocks. (R. 17.) 
Upon seeing that the motel room was occupied, the officers continued to knock on the 
door of motel room #201. (R. 82-83.) In fact, the officers knocked for an additional 45 seconds 
upon seeing that the room was occupied. (R. 82-83.) Finally, the occupant relented and opened 
the door. The officers asked the occupant for his name, date of birth and age. (R. 17.) When the 
occupant provided an age which did not correlate with his date of birth, the officers arrested him 
1
 At some point prior to knocking on Mr. Archibald's motel room door, Officer Hillam 
was joined by a second officer. 
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for giving false information to a police officer. (R. 17.) This occupant was later identified as 
Jonathan Archibald. (R. 23.) No evidence of drugs or solicitation was found in Mr. Archibald's 
room. (R. 23.) 
After reviewing these facts and hearing argument from both counsel, the district court 
took the matter under advisement and asked both the prosecutor and defense counsel to submit 
any additional case law to the court by the following day (October 17). (R. 94.) The court then 
informed counsel he would arrange a phone conference to render his decision (R. 94.) Rather 
than submit case law to the court, which defense counsel did, the prosecutor opted to finally 
respond to defense counsel's motion to suppress and memorandum in support thereof by filing a 
memorandum in opposition to the defense's motion to suppress on the 17th of October. (R. 26-
38.) Defense counsel filed a reply memorandum on the 19th of October, responding to the issues 
raised in the City's memorandum and asking the court to disregard the City's memorandum due 
to the untimeliness of the filing.2 (R. 40-46.) 
On October 30,2000, the court denied Mr. Archibald's motion to suppress. (R. 76.) As 
a result, Mr. Archibald entered a Serv3 or conditional plea of guilty to concealing identification. 
(R. 76-78.) The court sentenced Mr. Archibald to credit for time served and closed the case. (R. 
79.) 
2
 At the motion hearing, the prosecutor stated that she had "chose[n] not to file a motion 
in response." (R. 84.) Despite this representation, the prosecutor filed a written response. 
Defense counsel still objects to consideration of this motion due to its untimeliness and the fact 
that the City waived its right to file a responsive motion. 
3
 State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Police officers violated Mr. Archibald's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
seizures by knocking on his residence door at an unreasonable hour and refusing to leave, 
thereby seizing Mr. Archibald. The district court erred in concluding that such circumstances did 
not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT MR. 
ARCHIBALD WAS NOT SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
The trial court erred in its conclusion that the encounter between police officers and Mr. 
Archibald was consensual and therefore not in violation of Mr. Archibald's Fourth Amendment 
Rights. The trial court concluded that even though the officers knocked on Mr. Archibald's 
motel room door for a period of time, 
there is no evidence that Mr. Archibald had been seized or detained under the 
meaning, the legal meaning of that word. That as Ms. Ward had pointed out in 
her memorandum, all that the officers may have intended to do was ask Mr. 
Archibald questions. It may very well have been that if he had said I don't want 
to answer, they would have left him alone. We don't know that. But, in any 
event, that may have been their intention when they were knocking at the door. 
Other than to get him to come to the door, there is no evidence that they had 
actually detained him. Based on that evidence, that conclusion, I would conclude 
that there was no seizure and deny the defendant's motion to suppress evidence.4 
(R. 76.) 
4
 Defense counsel also argued that the officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
detain or seize Mr. Archibald. (R. 16-21; 43-46.) Because the district court concluded that Mr. 
Archibald was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, the court did not address the issue of 
whether the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize Mr. Archibald. 
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A. Mr. Archibald Was Seized for Fourth Amendment Purposes 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized three levels of police encounters with the public 
which are constitutionally permissible: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long 
as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if 
the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is about 
to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed. 
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 
223, 230 (5th Cir.1984) (citation omitted)). 
The hallmark of a level I voluntary police-citizen encounter is the right of a citizen to 
decline answering an officer's inquiries simply by walking away. Salt Lake City v. Rav. 998 
P.2d 274, 277 (Utah App. 2000); State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994); State v. 
Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App. 1990). Most level I encounters occur when a citizen in a 
public place is approached by police officers. See, e.g.. Rav. 998 P.2d at 274 (in front of a 
convenience store); Deitman. 739 P.2d at 616 (on public sidewalk/street); State v. Davis. 821 
P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1991) (on side of public road). A level I encounter may escalate into a level II 
encounter when, viewing the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe 
that he or she is not free to leave. State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 ,1227-28 (Utah App. 1997); 
Jackson. 805 P.2d at 767. A reasonable person would not feel free to leave when an officer, by 
show of physical force or authority, restrains that person's liberty. Ray. 998 P.2d at 277; Bean. 
869 P.2d at 986. The subjective intent of an officer is irrelevant to the determination of whether 
a Fourth Amendment seizure and/or violation has occurred. See Maryland v. Macon. 472 U.S. 
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463,470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778,2782-83, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) ("Whether a Fourth Amendment 
violation has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the 
facts and circumstances confronting him at the time' and not on the officer's actual state of mind 
at the time the challenged action was taken." (citation omitted) (quoting Scott v. United States, 
436 U.S. 128,136, 98 S.Ct. 1717,1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)). The encounter between Mr. 
Archibald and the police officers qualifies as a level II encounter due to the time the encounter 
occurred, the location of the encounter and the length of time the officers knocked on the door. 
i. Time of the Encounter 
It was nearly 11:00 p.m. when police officers began knocking on the door to Mr. 
Archibald's motel room. Absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. 
Archibald had engaged or was about to engage in criminal conduct, it was unreasonable for the 
police officers to knock on Mr. Archibald's motel room door given the time of night. Certainly 
no reasonable person would expect a visit from a friend or family member at such a late hour 
absent an emergency, let alone a police officer. 
What is objectively reasonable or unreasonable with regard to the time of day or night 
that an individual knocks on one's front door may be extrapolated from other related statutes and 
cases that define daytime and nighttime. 
Section 77-7-5 of Utah Code defines daytime and nighttime in the context of executing 
misdemeanor and felony arrest warrants. According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-5 (2) (1999), 
misdemeanor arrest warrants may only be executed during daytime hours, which the statute 
defines as anytime between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., while felony arrest warrants may be 
executed anytime, day or night. Nighttime is defined as anytime after 10:00 p.m. but before 6:00 
7 
a.m. 
In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-205 (1) (1999) requires all search warrants to be 
served and executed during the daytime "unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable 
cause to believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason." Interpreting this statute, the 
Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the term nighttime "means that period of time from one 
half hour after sunset to one half hour before sunrise." State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614,617 
(Utah App. 1993). 
These statutes are particularly instructive because they deal with situations where police 
officers have probable cause to either arrest an individual or search the premises belonging to 
that individual. That is, these definitions address situations where police officers are acting 
lawfully, with the requisite probable cause. However, even in these situations, there are limits to 
when it is permissible for officers to exercise their lawful authority. Where officers are acting 
without the benefit of probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, certainly they should be 
required to meet a higher standard of courtesy and respect. Regardless of which definition of 
nighttime is applied to this case, the officers knocking on Mr. Archibald's door at almost 11:00 
at night certainly would be considered unreasonable under either definition. 
ii Location of the Encounter 
Mr. Archibald was staying overnight in a motel room when officers knocked on his door 
at almost 11:00 p.m. There is no question that this motel room was Mr. Archibald's dwelling 
place the evening the officers knocked on his motel room door. When a citizen is inside his or 
her dwelling place, be it a home, motel or apartment, that citizen and his or her dwelling place 
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enjoy special protection under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9,16 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
Mr. Archibald's motel room had only one entrance and exit: the front door. (R. 89.) 
When two armed, uniformed police officers knocked on the door to his motel room at nearly 
11:00 p.m., Mr. Archibald looked out the window. (R. 17; 23.) Upon seeing the officers, Mr. 
Archibald moved away from the window with no intent of answering the door. (R. 17; 23.) 
Upon seeing Mr. Archibald and observing his apparent unwillingness to open the door, the 
officers did not leave the outer vestibule of his room. Instead, the officers knocked on the door 
to Mr. Archibald's room for an additional 45 seconds straight. (R. 17; 23.) With no way to leave 
the motel room to avoid the officers' disruption of the quiet enjoyment of his motel room, Mr. 
Archibald relented and answered the door. (R. 17.) The officers immediately questioned Mr. 
Archibald regarding his name, age and date of birth. (R. 17.) 
Based on these facts, the district court concluded "all that the officers may have intended 
to do was ask Mr. Archibald questions. It may very well have been that if he had said I don't 
want to answer, they would have left him alone. We don't know that. But, in any event, that 
may have been their intention when they were knocking at the door. Other than to get him to 
come to the door, there is no evidence that they had actually detained him." (R. 76.) 
The district court's analysis places heavy emphasis on the subjective intent of the police 
officers who went to Mr. Archibald motel room and persistently knocked on the only door 
leading into and out of the room. The subjective intentions of the police officers, lawful or 
unlawful, are irrelevant to the determination of whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred. 
See Macon, 472 U.S. at 470-71,105 S.Ct. at 2782-83, 86 L.Ed.2d at 370. The determination of 
9 
whether Mr. Archibald was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes is based on an objective 
view of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter between Mr. Archibald and 
the officers. Accordingly, the subjective intentions of the officers who persistently knocked on 
Mr. Archibald's motel room door are irrelevant. 
At the suppression hearing, the City argued that because Mr. Archibald was free to 
disregard the officers' knocking at his motel room door, he was not detained or seized within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The City asserted that because the police were in a public 
place, knocking on Mr. Archibald's door, and Mr. Archibald chose to answer the door, his action 
was voluntary and the encounter was consensual. (R. 87.) In support of its position, the City 
relied on California v. Hodari P., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547,113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) and 
United States v. $32,400.00. 82 F.3d 135 (7th Cir. 1996). 
In Hodari P.. police officers on routine patrol in a high-crime area in Oakland, California, 
observed five young men huddled around a red car. When the youth saw the police car 
approaching, they fled on foot and the officers gave chase. The defendant, one of the youth, fled 
down an alley but was soon located by one of the officers. As the officer began to close in on the 
defendant, he threw something. The officer tackled the defendant, handcuffed him and radioed 
for backup. It was later discovered that the item thrown by the defendant was crack cocaine. 
The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not seized at the time he threw the cocaine but 
was seized at the time the officer tackled him. The Court concluded that a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment only occurs "when the officer, by means of physical force or show of 
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." 499 U.S. at 625 (quoting Terry v. 
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,19, n. 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868,1879, n. 16,20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Because the 
10 
defendant had not submitted to the officer's show of authority, the defendant was not seized. It 
was only when the defendant submitted to the officer's show of authority (i.e., when he was 
tackled) that a seizure under the Fourth Amendment had occurred. 
Conversely, Mr. Archibald did submit to the officers' show of authority because he had 
no other option. This was not a street encounter where Mr. Archibald could simply turn and 
walk away; this was an encounter at Mr. Archibald's residence, with the officers blocking Mr. 
Archibald's only means of entry into and exit from the residence. Mr. Archibald looked out 
through the curtains of his motel room window, observed the officers and retreated into his room. 
The officers saw Mr. Archibald peek his head out from behind the curtains and at that point, 
knocked on his door for 45 seconds before Mr. Archibald submitted to their show of authority 
and finally opened the door. Thus, the instant matter occurred in a confined area, not on a public 
street, and unlike the defendant in Hodari P.. Mr. Archibald did submit to the officers' authority. 
The other case relied upon by the City below, United States v. $32,400.00, 82 F.3d 135 
(7th Cir. 1996), is similarly inapposite. In $32,4000.00, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded that a seizure did not occur when the defendant's vehicle was "boxed in" by two 
police cars because the defendant "did not in any way submit to any asserted show of authority." 
82 F.3d at 139. The defendant in $32,400.00 was inside her vehicle when it was boxed in by 
two police cars. Rather than exiting her vehicle and submitting to the officers' authority, the 
defendant attempted to flee the scene in her vehicle by ramming the police vehicles. Moreover, 
the police officers in $32,400.00 possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant 
11 
had engaged or was engaged in drug trafficking. Id at 140.5 Again, Mr. Archibald did submit to 
the officers' show of authority, unlike the defendant in $32,400.00. and Mr. Archibald had no 
reasonable means to disregard the show of authority, such as driving away in his vehicle like the 
defendant in $32.400.00 did. Thus, $32.400.00 bolsters Mr. Archibald's assertion that he was 
seized because he did submit to the officers' authority. Moreover, $32.400.00 is a Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision which is not controlling authority. 
In addressing an issue similar to that addressed by the Seventh Circuit, the Utah Court of 
Appeals in State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989), reached a different conclusion. In 
Smith, the defendant's vehicle was observed by a police officer pulled over to the right hand side 
of the road in an area with a high incidence of prostitution. Id at 880. The officer noticed an 
individual leaning into the defendant's vehicle through an unrolled passenger window. Id. 
When the individual saw the officer in a marked car, the individual walked toward a motel 
immediately adjacent to the defendant's vehicle. Id After the individual walked away, the 
defendant's vehicle made a right-hand turn into the driveway leading to the motel without 
signaling. Id The officer pulled his vehicle in behind the defendant's car, blocking the 
defendant's egress. Id Thereafter, the defendant exited his vehicle and the officer exited his 
vehicle; the defendant and officer met between the parked cars. Id The officer asked the 
5
 It must be noted that the 7th Circuit misstates the law in its restatement of the Hodari D. 
decision. The 7th Circuit erroneously states that Hodari D stands for the proposition that "[i]f no 
physical force accompanied the show of authority and a person chose to ignore or reject that 
show of authority, the defendant is not seized until the officer applied physical force and the 
person submitted to the officer's show of authority." $32.400.00. 82 F.3d at 138 (emphasis 
added), citing Hodari P.. 499 U.S. at 624-27. Hodari D. states no requirement that a person be 
subjected to physical force in order to be seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
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defendant for his car registration and identification. Id, The stop led to the defendant's arrest 
and an inventory search of his vehicle, which revealed small baggies of heroin and cocaine. Id. 
The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the stop, which the district court 
deemed a voluntary encounter. Id. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeal concluded that when 
the officer pulled his vehicle in behind the defendant's car, blocking the defendant's egress, the 
officer had seized the defendant for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id at 881-82. In reaching its 
conclusion the appellate court noted that "[o]ther jurisdictions have held that when an officer 
blocks a defendant's vehicle, a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment has occurred 
even though the original stop was not initiated by the officer." Id at 882 n.3. Applying the 
Smith analysis, Mr. Archibald was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Mr. Archibald was confronted by two uniformed police officers at his dwelling place at 
almost 11:00 p.m., which, as previously noted, is an unreasonable time. Because the officers 
were obstructing the only entrance into and exit from Mr. Archibald's room, he had no place to 
go if he wished to avoid the officers and clearly the officers were not content with Mr. 
Archibald's apparent unwillingness to speak with them. When the officers first knocked on the 
door, Mr. Archibald looked outside, saw the officers and declined to answer. The officers kept 
knocking, however, clearly conveying a message to Mr. Archibald that they were not going to 
leave until he answered the door. See Beavers. 859 P.2d at 17 (n[T]he only risk that exists if an 
investigatory stop is not effected is the risk that investigation of potential criminal activity might 
be delayed or, at worst, thwarted altogether. That risk is diminished in the residential setting 
because the person police wish to question is located in a dwelling that can generally be staked 
out until the person emerges, if a polite knock at the door fails to produce a suspect willing to 
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voluntarily answer police inquiries.11 (Emphasis added.)). Accordingly, the fact that Mr. 
Archibald was approached at his place of residence supports the conclusion that Mr. Archibald 
was detained or seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
iii. Length of Knocking 
The police officers went to Mr. Archibald's motel room after receiving an anonymous tip 
of possible criminal activities in the motel room, including "drugs and solicitation." (R. 16.) 
After the officers knocked on the door to Mr. Archibald's room, he looked out the window and 
seeing two uniformed, armed police officers, retreated back into his room and declined to answer 
the door. (R. 17.) Upon seeing Mr. Archibald through the window, the officers knocked again 
and did not stop knocking for 45 seconds. (R. 17; 82-83.) While 45 seconds may not seem like a 
significant period of time on paper, it is an unbearably long period of time when actually 
demonstrated. Defense counsel attempted to demonstrate how long 45 seconds really is by 
knocking for 45 seconds straight on the wooden podium in the courtroom, much in the same way 
a person would knock on a door. (R. 89.) The court stopped defense counsel after 15-20 seconds 
of knocking. (R. 89.) 
It is particularly revealing that once the police officers observed Mr. Archibald look out 
at them from his motel room window, they began knocking for 45 seconds. (R. 82-83.) Mr. 
Archibald's refusal to answer when the officers first knocked on the door to his motel room was 
a tacit declination of the officers' invitation to voluntarily come to the door. Given that Mr. 
Archibald first declined to answer the initial knocks at his door by the two officers and that the 
intensive, 45 second knocking began only after Mr. Archibald's refusal to answer the officers' 
first invitation to come to the door, a reasonable person in Mr. Archibald's position would 
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believe that the officers had no intention of leaving the motel room unless and until the occupant 
answered the officers' knocking. Thus, the length of the officers' knocking on Mr. Archibald's 
door supports the conclusion that Mr. Archibald was seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
B. THE OFFICERS LACKED REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO 
SEIZE MR. ARCHIBALD 
In light of its conclusion that the officers' encounter with Mr. Archibald was voluntary, 
the district court did not reach the issue of whether the officers possessed reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to seize and detain Mr. Archibald. This issue was argued to the district court below by 
both defense counsel and the prosecutor. 
Assuming that Mr. Archibald was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, to justify the 
seizure the officers must have possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Archibald had 
committed, was about to commit or was in the act of committing a crime. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999) (MA peace 
officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he 
has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions."). Generally, reasonable suspicion 
stems from an officer's first-hand observations, perceptions and inferences. Kavsville v. 
Mulcahy. 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah App. 1997). However, in some cases, an officer may rely 
upon second-hand information, including an informant's tip. Id. An officer's reliance upon an 
informant's tip for reasonable suspicion is permissible only if the tip is sufficiently reliable. Id.; 
State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah App. 1991). Reliability must extend beyond 
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information readily observable to the general public. Florida v. J.L.. 2000 WL 309131, * 4 (U.S. 
S. Ct. 2000). "The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion 
of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person." Id Utah appellate courts 
have identified three factors which must be evaluated in order to determine whether a tip is 
sufficiently reliable to qualify as reasonable suspicion: (1) the type of tip or informant involved; 
(2) whether the information about criminal activity is sufficiently detailed to support a stop; and 
(3) whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the information provided by the 
tip. Mulcahv. 943 P.2d at 235-36. 
Here, the police responded to Mr. Archibald's motel room based on anonymous tip 
reporting "drugs and solicitation." An anonymous complainant is on the low-end of the 
reliability scale because the complainant's basis of knowledge and veracity are unknown. IcL at 
235. Moreover, an unidentified complainant is not exposed to possible criminal or civil 
prosecution if the report is false. Id The anonymous tip here is quite unreliable under the first 
factor because the tipster is unidentified, and therefore not subject to criminal or civil prosecution 
for making a false report. It should be noted that Mr. Archibald was arrested for providing false 
information, not for solicitation or drug possession/trafficking. It may be assumed that the 
tipster's complaint was a false report. 
The information given to police by the anonymous tipster was that there were "drugs" in 
room 201 of the Motel 6 and that there was "solicitation" going on in the same room. This 
information is hardly sufficient to support a seizure of Mr. Archibald. The only information 
conveyed by this anonymous tip is that room 201 of the Motel 6 was occupied, a fact easily 
observable and not indicative of the detail necessary to show reliability. 
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Finally, the officers were unable to confirm any of the purported criminal activities in 
room 201 upon their arrival at the Motel 6. The officers observed nothing to confirm the 
anonymous tip of "drugs and solicitation" in room 201. Moreover, the officers did not even 
make an attempt to conduct surveillance on room 201. 
Additionally, the tip arrived through a police dispatch which merely identified alleged 
criminal activity and a motel room associated with that alleged activity. That anonymous tip 
seems to identify an "Asian female" as one of the purported suspects. Certainly Mr. Archibald is 
not an Asian female. "Merely providing descriptive information to an officer about whom to 
stop, by itself, is not enough to justify the stop if there are no articulable facts pointed to which 
establish why a stop was to be made." State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274,1278 (Utah App. 1994). 
Here, the officers possessed descriptive information that they were looking for, at least, an Asian 
female. That was all. "[I]f an investigating officer relies solely on transmitted information from 
other sources, no legally sufficient reasonable suspicion exists in the absence of a demonstrated 
factual basis for the issuing department's information." Id at 1279-80, citing United States v. 
Ornelas-Ledesma. 16 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir.1994) (uncorroborated tip by itself does not justify 
stop, even if tip comes from law enforcement sources); United States v. Cutchin. 956 F.2d 1216, 
1218 (D.C.Cir.1992) (evidence contained on 911 tapes goes directly to issue of whether dispatch 
had requisite reasonable suspicion); Ex parte State. 494 So.2d 719, 721 (Ala. 1986) (radio 
dispatch describing vehicle involved in drug sale not sufficient to justify stop absent evidence of 
circumstances giving rise to dispatch): Kaiser v. State. 296 Ark. 125,752 S.W.2d 271,272-73 
(1988) (no evidence in record to support reasonable suspicion for directive, broadcast by 
Missouri police to Arkansas police, to stop vehicle carrying drugs); In re Eskiel S.« 15 Cal.App. 
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4th 1638, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 455,458 (1993) (record devoid of evidence showing officer who 
originated report had reasonable suspicion); Village of Gurnee v. Gross. 174 Ill.App.3d 66, 123 
Ill.Dec. 866, 528 N.E.2d 411,412 (1988) (no evidence presented that related to source or factual 
basis of reckless driving complaint broadcast to investigating officer); Commonwealth v. Fraser. 
410 Mass. 541, 573 N.E.2d 979, 982 (1991) (no evidence indicating reasonable suspicion for 
officer making radio call describing armed person in vehicle); State v. Franklin. 841 S.W.2d 639, 
644 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (no evidence in record establishing basis of dispatch concerning armed 
individual in certain vehicle); State v. Thompson. 231 Neb. 771,438 N.W.2d 131,136-37 (1989) 
(no evidence in dispatch tape that proved factual foundation for a broadcast concerning a 
"suspicious" vehicle in a certain area); Garza v. State. 771 S.W.2d 549, 558-59 
(Tex.Crim.App.1989) (en banc) (officer who passed information that defendant was "good for" 
burglaries in investigating officer's area had no articulable facts to support statement). 
Considering these factors, the anonymous tip was wholly unreliable and uncorroborated. 




Considering the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Archibald was seized without 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Accordingly, we respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the district court's decision denying Mr. Archibald's motion to suppress and remand for 
further proceedings, if any. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /S^ day of March, 2001. 
S^NNONROMERO 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, SHANNON N. ROMERO, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight 
copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 
140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to Scott Fisher, City Prosecutor, 
Office of the Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 349 South 200 East, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this !3tL day of March, 2001. 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Salt Lake City Prosecutor as 
indicated above this day of March, 2001. 
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Addendum B 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
611 ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE 77-7-9 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the com-
mission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage prop-
erty belonging to another person. 1999 
77-7-3. By private persons. 
A private person may arrest another: 
(1) For a public offense committed or at-
tempted in his presence; or 
(2) When a felony has been committed and he 
has reasonable cause to believe the person ar-
rested has committed it. i960 
77-7-4. Magistrate may orally order arrest. 
A magistrate may orally require a peace officer to 
arrest anyone committing or attempting to commit a 
public offense in the presence of the magistrate, and, 
in the case of an emergency, when probable cause 
exists, a magistrate may orally authorize a peace 
officer to arrest a person for a public offense, and 
thereafter, as soon as practical, an information shall 
be filed against the person arrested. 1980 
77-7-5. I s suance of warrant — Time and place 
arrests m a y be made — Contents of 
warrant — Responsibility for trans-
port ing prisoners — Court clerk to 
d i s p e n s e restitution for transporta-
tion. 
(1) A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest 
upon finding probable cause to believe that the person 
to be arrested has committed a public offense. If the 
offense charged is: 
(a) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be 
made at any time of the day or night; or 
(b) a misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant 
can be made at night only if: 
(i) the magistrate has endorsed authoriza-
tion to do so on the warrant; 
(ii) the person to be arrested is upon a 
public highway, in a public place, or in a place 
open to or accessible to the public; or 
(iii) the person to be arrested is encoun-
tered by a peace officer in the regular course 
of that peace officer's investigation of a crimi-
nal offense unrelated to the misdemeanor 
warrant for arrest. 
For the purpose of Subsection (1): 
(a) daytime hours are the hours of 6:00 a.m. to^ 
10:00 p.m.; and 
(b) nighttime hours are the hours after 10:00 
p.m. and before 6:00 a.m. 
(3) (a) If the magistrate determines that the ac-
cused must appear in court, the magistrate shall 
include in the arrest warrant the name of the law 
enforcement agency in the county or municipality 
with jurisdiction over the offense charged. 
(b) (i) The law enforcement agency identified 
by the magistrate under Subsection (3Xa) is 
responsible for providing inter-county trans-
portation of the defendant, if necessary, from 
the arresting law enforcement agency to the 
court site. 
(ii) The law enforcement agency named on 
the warrant may contract with another law 
enforcement agency to have a defendant, 
transported. 
(c) (i) The law enforcement agency identified 
by the magistrate under Subsection (a) as 
responsible for transporting the defendant 
shall provide to the court clerk of the court in 
which the defendant is tried, an affidavit 
stating that the defendant was transported. 
indicating the law enforcement agency re-
sponsible for the transportation, and stating 
the number of miles the defendant was trans-
ported. 
(ii) The court clerk shall account for resti-
tution paid under Section 76-3-201 for gov-
ernmental transportation expenses and dis-
pense restitution monies collected by the 
court to the law enforcement agency respon-
sible for the transportation of a convicted 
defendant. 1999 
77-7-5.5. Repea led . 1991 
77-7-6. Manner of making arrest. 
(1) The person making the arrest shall inform the 
person being arrested of his intention, cause, and 
authority to arrest him. Such notice shall not be 
required when: 
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will 
endanger the life or safety of the officer or another 
person or will likely enable the party being ar-
rested to escape; 
(b) the person being arrested is actually en-
gaged in the commission of, or an attempt to 
commit, an offense; or 
(c) the person being arrested is pursued imme-
diately after the commission of an offense or an 
escape. 
(2) (a) If a hearing-impaired person, as defined in 
Subsection 78-24a-l(2), is arrested for an alleged 
violation of a criminal law, including a local 
ordinance, the arresting officer shall assess the 
communicative abilities of the hearing-impaired 
person and conduct this notification, and any 
further notifications of rights, warnings, interro-
gations, or taking of statements, in a manner that 
accurately and effectively communicates with the 
hearing-impaired person including qualified in-
terpreters, lip reading, pen and paper, typewrit-
ers, computers with print-out capability, and tele-
communications devices for the deaf. 
(b) Compliance with this subsection is a factor 
to be considered by any court when evaluating 
whether statements of a hearing-impaired person 
were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelli-
gently. 1995 
77-7-7. Force in making arrest. 
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly 
resists after being informed of the intention to make 
the arrest, the person arresting may use reasonable 
force to effect the arrest. Deadly force may be used 
only as provided in Section 76-2-404. i960 
77-7-8. Doors and windows may be broken, 
when. 
Tb make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is 
a felony, and in all cases, a peace officer, may break the 
door or window of the building in which the person to 
be arrested is, or in which there are reasonable 
grounds for believing him to be. Before making the 
break, the person shall demand admission and ex-
plain the purpose for which admission is desired. 
Demand and explanation need not be given before 
breaking under the exceptions in Section 77-7-6 or 
where there is reason to believe evidence will be 
secreted or destroyed. i960 
77-7-9. Weapons may be taken from prisoner. 
Any person making an arrest may seize from the 
person arrested all weapons which he may have on or 
about his person. i960 
619 PAEDONS AND PAROLES 77-27-21.5 
ing t he warrant to sign the magistrate's name on 
the warrant . This warrant shall be called a du-
plicate original warrant and shall be deemed a 
wa r r an t for purposes of this chapter. In these 
cases the magistrate shall cause to be made an 
original warrant. The magistrate shall enter the 
exact t ime of issuance of the duplicate original 
w a r r a n t on the face of the original warrant . 
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant and 
the original warrant shall be in conformity with 
this chapter. Upon return, the magistrate shall 
require the person who gave the sworn oral tes-
t imony establishing the grounds for issuance of 
the war ran t to sign a copy of the transcript. 
(3) If probable cause is shown, the magistrate shall 
issue a search warrant. 1998 
77-23-205. T ime for s e rv ice — Officer may r e -
quest assistance. 
(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in the 
warrant that it be served in the daytime, unless the 
affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable cause to 
believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the 
property prior to it being concealed, destroyed, dam-
aged, altered, or for other good reason; in which case 
he may insert a direction that it be served any time of 
the day or night. An officer may request other persons 
to assist him in conducting the search. 
(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten 
days from the date of issuance. Any search warrant 
not executed within this time shall be void and shall 
be returned to the court or magistrate as not executed. 
1994 
77-23-206. Rece ip t for property taken. 
When the officer seizes property pursuant to a 
search warrant , he shall give a receipt to the person 
from whom it was seized or in whose possession it was 
found. If no person is present, the officer shall leave 
t he receipt in the place where he found the property. 
Fai lure to give or leave a receipt shall not render the 
evidence seized inadmissible a t trial. 1994 
77-23-207. Return — Inventory of property 
taken. 
The officer, after execution of the warrant, shall 
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to the 
magistrate and deliver a written inventory of any-
thing seized, stating the place where it is being held. 
1994 
77-23-208. Safekeeping of property. 
The officer seizing the property shall be responsible 
for i ts safekeeping and maintenance until the court 
otherwise orders. 1994 
77-23-209. Return of papers to district court. 
The magistrate shall annex to the depositions and 
affidavits upon which the search warrant is based, the 
search warrant , the return, and the inventory. If he is 
wi thout authority to proceed further with respect to 
the offense under which the warrant was issued, he 
shall r e tu rn them to the appropriate court of the 
county having jurisdiction within 15 days after the 
return. 1994 
77-23-210. Force used in execut ing warrant — 
When notice of authority i s required 
a s a prerequisite. 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing 
1 entry into any building, room, conveyance, compart-
| ment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the 
warrant may use such force as is reasonably neces-
sary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, 
there is no response or he is not admitted with 
reasonable promptness; or 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, 
if the magistrate issuing the war ran t directs in 
the warrant that the officer need not give notice. 
The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, 
under oath, tha t the object of the search may be 
quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or t ha t 
physical ha rm may result to any person if notice 
were given. 1994 
77-23-211. Violation of heal th , safety, bui lding, 
or animal cruelty l a w s or ord inances 
— Warrants to obtain ev idence . 
In addition to other warrants provided by this 
chapter, magistrates, upon a showing of probable 
cause to believe a state, county, or city law or ordi-
nance, has been violated in relation to heal th, safety, 
building, or animal cruelty, may issue a war ran t for 
the purpose of obtaining evidence of a violation. War-
rants may be obtained from a magistrate upon re-
quest of peace officers and state, county, and munici-
pal health, fire, building, and animal control 
personnel only after approval by a prosecuting attor-
ney. A search warrant issued under this section shall 
be directed to any peace officer within the county 
where the warrant is to be executed, who shall serve 
the same. Other concerned personnel may accompany 
the officer. 1994 
77-23-212. Evidence se ized pursuant to war-
rant not exc luded u n l e s s unlawful 
search or se izure substant ia l — "Sub-
stantial" defined. 
(1) Property or evidence seized pursuant to a 
search warrant may not be suppressed at a motion, 
trial, or other proceeding, unless the unlawful conduct 
of the peace officer is shown to be substantial. 
(2) Any unlawful search or seizure shall be consid-
ered substantial and in bad faith if the w a r r a n t was 
obtained with malicious purpose and wi thout prob-
able cause or was executed maliciously and willfully 
beyond the authority of the war ran t or with unneces-
sary severity. 1997 
CHAPTER 27 
PARDONS AND PAROLES 
Section 
77-27-21.5. Sex offender registration — Informa-
tion system — Law enforcement and 
courts to report — Registration — 
x Penalty — Effect of expungement. 
77-27-21.5. Sex offender registration — Infor-
mation system — Law enforcement 
and courts to report — Registration — 
Penalty — Effect of expungement. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Department" means the Department of 
Corrections. 
(b) "Notification" means a person's acquisition 
of information from the department about a sex 
offender, including his place of habitation, physi-
cal description, and methodology of the offense, 
and other information as provided in Subsections 
(10) and (11). 
(c) "Register" means to comply with the rules 
of the department made under this section. 
77-7-10 CRIMINAL AND TRAFFIC CODE 612 
77-7-10. Telegraph or telephone authorization 
of execution of arrest warrant. 
Any magistrate may, by an endorsement on a war-
rant of arrest, authonze by telegraph, telephone or 
other reasonable means, its execution A copy of the 
warrant or notice of its issuance and terms may be 
sent to one or more peace officers The copy or notice 
communicated authorizes the officer to proceed in the 
same manner under it as if he had an original war-
rant 1980 
77-7-11. Possession of warrant by arresting of-
ficer not required. 
Any peace officer who has knowledge of an out-
standing warrant of arrest may arrest a person he 
reasonably believes to be the person described in the 
warrant, without the peace officer having physical 
possession of the warrant i960 
77-7-12. Detaining persons suspected of shop-
lifting or library theft — Persons au-
thorized. 
(1) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's em-
ployee, servant, or agent who has reasonable grounds 
to believe that goods held or displayed for sale by the 
merchant have been taken by a person with intent to 
steal may, for the purpose of investigating the unlaw-
ful act and attempting to effect a recovery of the goods, 
detain the person in a reasonable manner for a 
reasonable length of time 
(2) A peace officer or employee of a library may 
detain a person for the purposes and under the limits 
of Subsection (1) if there are reasonable grounds to 
believe the person violated Title 76, Chapter 6, Pa r t 8, 
Library Theft 1987 
77-7-13. Arrest without warrant by p e a c e offi-
cer — Reasonable grounds , w h a t con-
s t i tutes — Exemption from civi l or 
cr iminal liability. 
(1) A peace officer may arrest, without warrant, 
any person the officer has reasonable ground to be-
heve has committed a theft under Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Part 8, Library Theft, or of goods held or displayed for 
sale 
(2) A charge of theft made to a peace officer under 
Part 8, Library Theft, by an employee of a library, or 
by a merchant, merchant's employee, servant, or 
agent constitutes a reasonable ground for arrest, and 
the peace officer is relieved from any civil or criminal 
liability 1998 
77-7-14. Person causing detention or arrest of 
person suspected of shoplifting or li-
brary theft — Civil and criminal im-
munity. 
(1) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's em-
ployee, servant, or agent who causes the detention of 
a person as provided m Section 77-7-12, or who causes 
the arrest of a person for theft of goods held or 
displayed for sale, is not criminally or civilly liable 
where he has reasonable and probable cause to be-
lieve the person detained or arrested committed a 
theft of goods held or displayed for sale 
(2) A peace officer or employee of a l ibrary who 
causes a detention or arrest of a person under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Par t 8, Library Theft, is not criminally or 
civilly liable where he has reasonable and probable 
cause to believe tha t the person committed a theft of 
library materials 1987 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to s to p and 
ques t ion suspect — Grounds . 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is m the act of committmg or is attempt-
ing to commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
1980 
77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk sus-
pect for dangerous weapon — 
Grounds. 
A peace officer who has stopped a person tempo-
rarily for questioning may frisk the person for a 
dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any 
other person is m danger 1980 
77-7-17. Authori ty of peace officer to take pos-
session of weapons. 
A peace officer who finds a dangerous weapon pur-
suant to a frisk may take and keep it until the 
completion of the questioning, at which time he shall 
either return it if lawfully possessed, or arrest such 
person 1980 
77-7-18. Citat ion on misdemeanor or infraction 
charge. 
A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person into 
custody, any public official of any county or municipal-
ity charged with the enforcement of the law, a port-
of-entry agent as defined in Section 72-1-102, and a 
volunteer authorized to issue a citation under Section 
41-6-19 5 may issue and deliver a citation requiring 
any person subject to arrest or prosecution on a 
misdemeanor or infraction charge to appear at the 
court of the magistrate before whom the person 
should be taken pursuant to law if the person had 
been arrested 1998 
77-7-19. Appearance required by citation — Ar-
rest for failure to appear — Transfer of 
case s — Motor vehicle violations — 
Dispos i t ion of fines and costs. 
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall 
appear before the magistrate designated m the cita-
tion on or before the tune and date specified in the 
citation unless the uniform bail schedule adopted by 
the Judicial Council or Subsection 77-7-21(1) permits 
forfeiture of bail for the offense charged 
(2) A citation may not require a person to appear 
sooner than five days or later than 14 days following 
its issuance 
(3) A person who receives a citation and who fails to 
comply with Section 77-7-21 on or before the tune and 
date and at the court specified is subject to arrest The 
* magistrate may issue a warrant of arrest 
(4) Except where otherwise provided by law, a 
citation or information issued for violations of Title 41 
shall state that the person receiving the citation or 
information shall appear before the magistrate who 
has jurisdiction over the offense charged 
(5) Any justice court judge may, upon the motion of 
either the defense attorney or prosecuting attorney, 
based on a lack of territorial jurisdiction or the dis-
qualification of the judge, transfer cases to a justice 
court with territorial jurisdiction or the district court 
within the county 
(6) (a) Clerks and other administrative personnel 
serving the courts shall ensure that all citations 
for violation of Title 41 are filed in a court with 
jurisdiction and venue and shall refuse to receive 
citations that should be filed in another court 
(b) Fines, fees, costs, and forfeitures imposed 
or collected for violations of Title 41, which are 
filed contrary to this section shall be paid to the 
entitled municipality or county by the state, 
county, or municipal treasurer who has received 
